How Democracies Die. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt.
Historically, we think of democracies as giving way to dictatorships after violent military coups or violent revolutions. However, since the end of the Cold War, most breakdowns have not been from violent overthrow by outsiders but from subversion of democratic institutions from within government by elected leaders. This has been the case in Venezuela, Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. This process is dangerously deceptive, since it fails to command the immediate public recognition of a violent coup, as in Pinochet’s Chile.
The authors assess US vulnerability to this sequence by focusing on its ability to identify and stop would-be autocrats before they come to power and to defend the constitution from their subversion if they do come to power. They focus on the major role of political parties in this defense by acting as gatekeepers to filter out dangerous candidates in early stages of their careers and by standing against their abuse of constitutional processes if elected. They note that the US Republican Party has failed badly on both counts for these roles.
A checklist of four behavioral warning signs is provided to identify an authoritarian politician: 1) rejection of democratic rules, 2) denial of opponents’ legitimacy, 3) toleration or encouragement of violence, 4) willingness to curtail civil liberties of opponents and the media. With the exception of Richard Nixon, no major-party presidential candidate met even one of these criteria over the last century, but Donald Trump meets all four. Not even Nixon demonstrated such a weak public commitment to constitutional rights and democratic norms.
The authors emphasize that paralyzing polarization and dysfunctional government cannot be avoided by constitutional requirements alone. Following well established norms is essential, including for recognition and respect of loyal opposition and for forbearance from using legally possible but extremely disruptive partisan measures.
The constitution created the Electoral College to provide defense by nonpartisan notables against popularly elected dangerous individuals. However, the constitution did not envision political parties, and the Electoral College soon surrendered this gatekeeping authority to the parties, which then sent party loyalists rather than local notables to the Electoral College.
In 1972, the role of the parties as filters was greatly weakened by creation of a system of binding presidential primaries. Thereafter, the parties were presented with candidates who had already preselected themselves by performance in primaries and caucuses, greatly assisted by wealthy donors and alternate media.
Perhaps the most striking example of rewriting the rules within government to lock in authoritarian, single-party rule occurred in the US with the end of post-Civil War reconstruction in the 1870s. Democracy was essentially killed by quasi-legal measures, despite African American constitutional protections and African American majorities or near-majorities in many states. The Great Compromise of 1877 for the R. B. Hayes election and many Supreme Court rulings ended Union enforcement of voting rights and most other African American rights in the South.
Subsequently, all eleven post-Confederate states ended elective democracy by reforming their constitutions and electoral laws to disenfranchise African Americans. Black turnout fell from 96% in 1876 to 11% in 1898 and remained low until the 1940s, when registration was only 5%. This shameful, markedly autocratic situation was tolerated by both parties until the Civil Rights laws of the 1960s. Evidently, this craven toleration was the price for maintaining relatively lower polarization between the parties that persisted until the issue of Civil Rights was finally addressed in the 1960s.
Since the 1960s, US political polarization and dysfunction have steadily increased, at least partly due to backlash from the Civil Rights Laws. Other contributing factors include greatly increased special interest money in politics, Republican fear of changing demographics for Whites and Christians, and increasingly divisive tactics of the leaders of the Republican Party who are now willing to hang on to power by any means possible, democratic or not.
For instance, Newt Gingrich led in the 1990s by refusing to compromise, obstructing government, and instructing Republican candidates to describe Democrats with negative words like pathetic, sick, bizarre, betray, antiflag, antifamily, and traitors. Mitch McConnell led in the 2010s by preventing any Republican votes for almost all Democratic legislation, bringing use of the filibuster to new levels, and flouting constitutional requirements for Senate approval of Supreme Court appointees. In the 2016 Republican convention, leaders called their Democratic rival a criminal and led chants to “lock her up”.
From the 1870s to the 1960s, the norms of respect for loyal opposition and forbearance from extremely destructive partisan acts were essentially maintained and polarization was avoided. Sadly, this was because both parties ignored racist abuses in the Jim Crow South, and essentially threw Southern African Americans under the bus. After the 1960s, the forces of racism moved to mostly one party, and the seeds for subsequent extreme polarization were sown and have continued to grow.
The path out of this mess is complicated. One path would include the parties learning to cooperate, as has been done in other countries. Good luck with that. Another path includes proposed reforms, including ending gerrymandering, open primaries, obligatory voting, and the like. Good luck in passing those reforms. Finally, reshuffling of what the parties stand for, particularly the Republican Party, whose leadership has been eviscerated by numerous well-funded outside groups and donors. Reducing polarization requires that the Republican Party be reformed, if not refounded outright. Perhaps a series of electoral defeats will be required to accomplish this.
